BP Oil Spill Probes Find Deficiencies, Disagreements (Correct)

May 27 (Bloomberg) -- BP Plc and Transocean Ltd. managers disagreed on how to proceed with work hours before the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, and a review in 2007 found staff-training deficiencies, according to testimony at a Louisiana hearing.

The disagreement, which occurred about 11 hours before the April 20 blast that left a well gushing oil into the Gulf of Mexico, ended with BP prevailing and a Transocean official “reluctantly” agreeing to proceed with work, Douglas Brown, Transocean’s chief mechanic for the vessel, said yesterday at the hearing conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service.

Brown said he heard Jimmy Harrell, Transocean’s top rig manager on the Deepwater Horizon, leave the meeting saying, “Guess that’s what we have those pinchers for.” Brown said he took that as a reference to the shear rams on a piece of equipment called a blowout preventer, which are designed to clamp shut and cut off the flow of oil and gas through the drill pipe in the event of emergency.

The hearing is part of several federal investigations that are being held in Washington and Louisiana to determine the cause of the disaster.

An investigator for BP told staff of the House Energy & Commerce Committee that rig operators erred by releasing pressure in a “kill line” while pressure in a drill pipe remained at 1,400 pounds per square inch, according to a congressional memo dated May 25 and signed by Democratic Representatives Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak.

‘Fundamental Mistake’

“BP’s investigator indicated that a ‘fundamental mistake’ may have been made here because this was an ‘indicator of a very large abnormality,’” the lawmakers wrote in the summary prepared for members of the House panel, which will hold a hearing on the spill today. Waxman of California is the committee’s chairman, and Stupak of Michigan heads its investigations panel.

A review of the Deepwater Horizon rig in 2007 found staff training was deficient, along with “safety critical” items that were overdue, according to David McKay, a surveyor with Oslo-based Det Norske Veritas SA who testified at the hearing.

BP, based in London, yesterday began its most ambitious attempt to plug the leak by pumping mud-like drilling fluid into the well, according to a statement. The effort is aimed at tamping down the gusher of oil and natural gas and then sealing the well with cement. Success would bring to an end a leak that has poured millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf and soiled at least 70 miles (113 kilometers) of coastline.

BP’s Higher Estimate

BP has estimated the well is leaking about 5,000 barrels of oil a day. A BP document shows it may be leaking about 14,000 barrels daily, U.S. Representative Edward Markey said yesterday.

The internal BP document from April 27 put a high estimate for the leak at 14,266 barrels a day, Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat, said yesterday at a House Natural Resources Committee hearing. At the time, BP was saying publicly that its well was leaking 1,000 barrels a day, Markey said.

The congressional memo provides an account of events on the rig in the 24 hours before the explosion, based on the BP investigator’s interpretation. It doesn’t include information from Transocean, the owner of the rig, or Halliburton Co., the contractor involved in cementing the well.

‘Large Plume of Gas’

A BP safety official said yesterday that a gas plume developed at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20 just before the explosion that killed 11 workers and triggered an oil leak still fouling the Gulf of Mexico.

“This was a pretty large plume of gas,” said Mark Bly, BP’s group head of safety and operations, during a briefing in Washington. “It was large enough that there was a high likelihood it would have ignited.”

An influx of gas at the deep-water well and a lack of recognition by employees that gas was rising up the well were among critical events before the explosion, according to a summary of the preliminary investigation by a BP team provided by the company at the Washington briefing.

Operators on the rig missed a series of warning signs, including indications that more fluid was flowing out of the well than was being pumped in, according to the congressional memo.

Five hours before the blast, a riser pipe had a loss of fluid, suggesting leaks. Four hours before, a system gained 15 barrels of fluid when 5 were expected, suggesting an “influx from the well,” according to the memo. Later, 41 minutes before the explosion, the pump was shut down and pressure unexpectedly increased.

The operators also had trouble with cement used to hold back gas in the well, and a step in the cementing process had to be repeated nine times, according to the memo. A test performed after cementing was complete “may not have been definitive.” The cement may have been contaminated, making it weaker than it was intended to be, according to the memo.
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